On Hiatus

Climate Dilemma will be on hiatus for approximately six months, due to work commitments.

If you wish to read more about climate change, mathematics, and stuff, below are some publications:

• Wood, P. J. 2004. Wavelets and Hilbert Modules. Journal of Fourier Analysis and Applications 10 (6). pp. 593-598
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00041-004-0828-4
• Robins, V., Wood, P.J., and Sheppard, A. P. 2010. Theory and algorithms for constructing discrete Morse complexes from grayscale digital images. Accepted January 2010 in IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence.
• Wood, P. J., and Jotzo, F. 2011. Price floors for emissions trading. Energy Policy 39 (3). pp. 1746-1753.
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.01.004
• Wood, P. J. 2011. Climate Change and Game Theory. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1219. pp. 153-170
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05891.x

 

A ‘six-pack’ for long-term cooperative action

This post first appeared on East Asia Forum.

The negotiators at Cancún are currently trying to negotiate a ‘balanced package’ – also known as a ‘six-pack’ – that combines progress on mitigation, transparency (measurement, reporting and verification – or MRV), adaptation, finance, technology, and REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation). The Mexicans are extremely determined to get some sort of outcome from the conference – both for the climate and for multilateral negotiations. They so far seem to have been quite confident in the way that they have facilitated the negotiations, and there seems to be much more trust in the Mexicans from Parties than there was for the Danes last year.

What is uncertain is how ‘good’ the decisions will be – in terms of criteria such as ambition (including capacity to ramp up ambition later), efficiency and equity; how detailed the decisions would be; and whether there is sufficient consensus to get a package of decisions at all. Different Parties are interested in progress on different elements of the six-pack, so the total level of progress will be determined by whatever element has the least progress. For example, the United States requires progress on mitigation and transparency in order to support progress on adaptation, finance, technology and REDD+.

There are two tracks to the negotiations: one track is focused on further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol for ‘Annex I parties’ (which consists of developing countries, but does not include many countries that could be considered ‘developed’ such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore); the other track is focused on implementing the Bali Action Plan – that covers the six-pack described above. Developing countries (including China) have stated that for an agreement, they require progress on a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. There could be progress on ‘technical’ aspects of the Kyoto Protocol – such as new gases, surplus emission allocations, and accounting for forest management. But Japan has now stated clearly what many have already known – that they do not intend to inscribe their target into the second commitment period. If this issue is not resolved, it could cause a potential deal to unravel.

Below is a summary of where things are at in the six-pack:

• On mitigation, key questions are how to anchor pledges that were part of the Copenhagen accord, and what could be done later to increase ambition. Points of contention include how developed country commitments relate to the Kyoto Protocol and the nature of developing country commitments. China has said that it would submit its emission reductions as a binding UN resolution – but this is conditional on progress on a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol. Todd Stern has described China’s announcement as nothing new.
• There is some information on transparency in the negotiating text, but the United States want more detail. The Indian Environment Minister Jayram Ramesh has put forward a proposal, but it is uncertain how much support there is for it from major developing countries.
• On adaptation, there is relatively clean text. But some countries (including Saudi Arabia) want adaptation to be linked to ‘response measures’, which essentially means that as well as assisting countries with adapting to the effects of climate change, oil exporting countries would somehow be compensated for lost fossil fuel revenue.
• On finance, a major point of debate has been the establishment of a fund, that was called for as part of the Copenhagen Accord. Some countries wanted it established at Cancún, but others argue that time will be needed to set it up and that it should instead be set up in the period between Cancún and the negotiations next year in Durban, South Africa. Areas of discussion include the transitional committee to set it up, the operating entity of the fund, and its relationship to the World Bank. Australia’s Minister Combet has been involved with consultations on finance.
• On technology, there is clean text, but the United States is likely to block progress if they do not see progress on other issues.
• The text on REDD+ is largely complete, with most of the remaining areas of disagreement (mainly on the role of market mechanisms) expressed as clear options.

The Mexican Foreign minister, Patricia Espinosa, stated on Wednesday December 8 that an ambitious and broad package of decisions is within reach but we no not have it in our grasp. We are now in the final stage of negotiations, where the final political issues need to be resolved, and negotiators may not get much sleep. If nearly 200 countries can come up with an ambitious and broad package of decisions, it will be a major success in diplomacy that could rejuvenate the UN process.

 

Public Interest in Climate Change is at an All Time High

According to Google Trends. I guess it might have something to do with COP 15.

 

Contact Group on ‘Numbers’ – Day Two

Here is a summary of what happened at the December 9 meeting of the contact group on Annex I Parties’ emission reductions (aggregate/individual). Of particular interest was the discussion of the nature of Russia’s possible increased commitment, complaints from developing countries about conditional commitments having conditions related to the rest of the negotiation process, and a presentation from the EU on how a 30% aggregate reduction from Annex I countries could work, but how this would be undermined by permits being carried over from the first Kyoto commitment period, or a perverse LULUCF outcome.

There is coverage of the Contact Group on ‘numbers’ in the Earth Negotiation Bulletin. The particular bulletin covering this meeting is here.

At the same time as this meeting was happening, the COP Plenary was having a lively discussion on a proposal from Tuvalu for a strong legally binding treaty. The establishment of a contact group to discuss this proposal was blocked by Saudi Arabia, India, China, and some other oil exporting countries.

 

Climate Dilemma arrives in Copenhagen

Climate Dilemma is in Copenhagen, and there will be updates on the progress of the UNFCCC negotiations on this website. With more bikes than cars, and none of the cyclists being in a hurry, Copenhagen is a quite civilised city. There is quite a bit of interest in the upcoming negotiations, and today there were many children demonstrating in the streets – an important reminder of the significance of climate change for future negotiations.

The Children of Copenhagen Demonstrating about Climate Change

Today I gave a talk at the Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen, on Climate Change and Game Theory. The slides are here.

 

Big Balls of Mud

Over dinner I was contemplating the similarities between software architecture and legal architecture. After all — reading something like the Waxman-Markey Bill or the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme legislation is very much like reading source code. Then it dawned on me — in the field of software development, there is a way of describing the climate architecture that is being discussed in the UNFCCC negotiations. It is called a big ball of mud. Wikipedia describes it as follows:

In computer programming, a big ball of mud is a system or computer program that appears to have no distinguishable architecture. It usually features other anti-patterns.

Here is a definition:

A Big Ball of Mud is a haphazardly structured, sprawling, sloppy, duct-tape-and-baling-wire, spaghetti-code jungle. These systems show unmistakable signs of unregulated growth, and repeated, expedient repair. Information is shared promiscuously among distant elements of the system, often to the point where nearly all the important information becomes global or duplicated. The overall structure of the system may never have been well defined. If it was, it may have eroded beyond recognition. Programmers with a shred of architectural sensibility shun these quagmires. Only those who are unconcerned about architecture, and, perhaps, are comfortable with the inertia of the day-to-day chore of patching the holes in these failing dikes, are content to work on such systems.

A big ball of mud is the architecture you get when there is no architecture. This is why the legal architecture of a post-2012 framework is so important.

 

Submission to the Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy

My submission to the Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy is here. Here is the abstract:

This submission is on the Australian Government’s Exposure Draft Legislation for the implementation the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), and Australia’s climate policy in general.

This submission is primarily concerned with two issues. Firstly we shall look at the issue of achieving international cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We shall examine how this relates to the targets in the CPRS, and the approach for choosing targets, based on “scheme caps and gateways”. This relates to items (1) (c) and (1) (d) of the terms of reference.

Secondly we examine the issue of what is the best instrument for a carbon price signal. We conclude that an emission trading scheme with a “price floor” is the most appropriate policy for Australia. This relates to items (1) (a) and (1) (d) of the terms of reference.

Summary of Recommendations

We have two key recommendations.

1. To not set a lower bound for Australia’s emissions after 2015. We therefore recommend the removal of paragraphs 2(b) and 3(b) from Section 15 of the Exposure Draft Legislation.
2. To introduce a floor in the carbon price. The price floor could be implemented by either altering Section 129 of the Exposure Draft Legislation, or by altering Section 103 of the Exposure Draft Legislation.

 

Australia due to announce 2020 target — Kevin Rudd portrays himself as “sensible centrist”

The Australian Government will release its Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme White Paper on December 15. This will include a target range for greenhouse gas emissions in 2020. Australia has drawn considerable criticism from the international community because it has reneged on its commitment to announce it targets at the climate negotiations in Poznan. In an interview with Kerry O’Brien on the 7.30 Report, Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stated:

KEVIN RUDD: … And I’m sure when this is delivered, early next week, we’ll get attacked from the left, from the right, we’ll get attacked by various radical green groups saying that we haven’t gone far enough because we haven’t closed down the coal industry by next Thursday.

KERRY O’BRIEN: I think that’s a little unkind, but …

KEVIN RUDD: Well, I think it’s – no, Kerry, this is absolutely true. We’ll be attacked from the far right and by various business groups, I suppose, and certainly the Liberal Party, for doing anything at all. And we’ll be attacked by extreme green groups for not taking the most radical course of action.

KERRY O’BRIEN: Okay.

KEVIN RUDD: We intend to steer a balanced course.

As well as using straw-man style arguments to attack critics, the Prime Minister is arguing that his target will be appropriate because he will be criticised from both sides. This does not make sense — whether Australia’s targets are appropriate depends on the science, on whether they are equitable, on whether they are achievable, and whether they will increase the likelihood of a comprehensive international agreement that will mitigate climate change. What is not relevant is whether they are criticised by participants in two different sides of a political debate. Instead of underestimating the intelligence of the Australian public, the Prime Minister should address the important issues.

The following cartoon illustrates the Prime Minister’s argument quite well (hat tip to JulieG).

Update: There is an open comments thread and links post on the White Paper at Larvatus Prodeo. The White Paper is here, the target range is 5%-15% reductions compared to 2000 by 2020.

 

What implications does Obama’s victory have for climate change?

The key test of whether Obama is serious about reducing climate change will be the US position in international climate change negotiations leading up to the Copenhagen meeting in December 2009.

The Garnaut Climate Change Review did some modeling of 2020 and 2050 allocations for different countries based on a contraction and convergence approach to international emissions allocations, including for the US and Australia. There are two key factors associated with contraction and convergence, the contraction rate (which will determine the eventual stabilisation target) and the convergence date (which has very important equity issues). There is a much better change of a good comprehensive international agreement if the US would be willing to accept C&C, and accept a high contraction rate and an early convergence date.

The convergence date is the date at which all countries are allocated the same amount of per-capita emissions. A late convergence date, such as 2050, rewards high per-capita emitters by giving them more emissions allocations. Earlier convergence dates mean that high per-capita emitters, such as the US and Australia, will have deeper reductions in their 2020 allocations — if these countries pollute more than their allocation, they will have to purchase emission allocations from other countries. The Obama-Biden campaign’s climate policy is as follows:

Reduce Carbon Emissions 80 Percent by 2050: Barack Obama and Joe Biden support implementation of a market-based cap-and-trade system to reduce carbon emissions by the amount scientists say is necessary: 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. They will start reducing emissions immediately in his administration by establishing strong annual reduction targets, and they will also implement a mandate of reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.

These figures are consistent with a stabilisation target of 550 ppm if the convergence date was 2050. According to Stern (p 195), a 550 ppm stabilisation target is 99% likely to lead to over 2 degrees C of warming, 69% likely to lead to over 3 degrees of warming, 53% likely to lead to over 4 degrees of warming, and 41% likely to lead to over 5 degrees of warming. This would have an unacceptably high likelihood of catastrophic impacts on civilisation and the planet.

In short, Obama’s policies are not as bad as the Australian policy of a 60% reduction by 2050, but are still not appropriate. They have an unacceptably high risk of catastrophic climate impacts, and shift too much of the job of reducing emissions away from the US.

Unfortunately, the Garnaut Review only modeled a convergence date of 2050, but the Global Commons Institute has tools available for modeling other convergence dates. For stabilisation at 450 ppm and a convergence date of 2050, Garnaut suggested that the US would have to have an allocation in 2020 of approximately 28% less than 2000 levels. Greenhouse gas levels will depend on carbon cycle feedbacks, worse feedbacks would require more reductions in allocations. A stabilisation target of 350 ppm would be much safer than 450 ppm.

Obama has got some policies right, such as 100% auctioning of emission permits, deployment of renewable energy, better energy efficiency, better electricity grid infrastructure, and weatherizing low-income households.

 

Treasury modeling released – suggests the Australian government is planning very weak emission reductions

The Australian Treasury has released economic modeling of the potential economic impacts of reducing emissions. The report, Australia’s Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation is available for download here.

The Treasury report has some very interesting clues about what targets the government is considering. One (CPRS-5) is for Australia to have a 5% reduction by 2020 compared to 2000 levels and 60% by 2050. The other (CPRS-15) is for Australia to have a 15% reduction by 2020 compared to 2000 levels and 60% by 2050. They claim that CPRS-5 would correspond to a global stabilisation target of 550 ppm and CPRS-15 would correspond to a global stabilisation target of 510 ppm.

There is no way in hell that the international community could accept a 5% reduction from Australia that corresponds to a 550 ppm target, or 15% corresponding to a 510 ppm target. These targets would involve Australia free-riding on other countries emission reductions. This suggests that Australia is more interested in an international bargaining position that is based on Australia doing as little effort as it can get away with as possible for a given stabilisation target. The report assumes a `multi–stage’ approach for international emission allocations, where all developed countries are allocated the same reduction in emissions. This rewards high per-capita emitters (like Australia) and punishes low per-capita emitters. This suggests that Australia’s international bargaining position is based on rent-seeking. The Contraction and Convergence scenario’s suggested by the Garnaut Review have a very late convergence date of 2050, which also rewards high per-capita emitters.

It is worth noting that even the `multi–stage’ approach is not consistent with Australia’s emissions being as high as 60% reduction by 2050.

More realistic targets for Australia that are based around these dangerously high stabilisation targets are 15-40% reductions by 2020 for 550 ppm and 20-45% reductions by 2020 for 510 ppm. My estimates are based on a Contraction and Convergence agreement with convergence dates between 2030 and 2050 and with international trading of emissions allocations.

 

Word cloud

Courtesy of wordle.