Here is a summary of what happened at the December 9 meeting of the contact group on Annex I Parties’ emission reductions (aggregate/individual). Of particular interest was the discussion of the nature of Russia’s possible increased commitment, complaints from developing countries about conditional commitments having conditions related to the rest of the negotiation process, and a presentation from the EU on how a 30% aggregate reduction from Annex I countries could work, but how this would be undermined by permits being carried over from the first Kyoto commitment period, or a perverse LULUCF outcome.

There is coverage of the Contact Group on ‘numbers’ in the Earth Negotiation Bulletin. The particular bulletin covering this meeting is here.

At the same time as this meeting was happening, the COP Plenary was having a lively discussion on a proposal from Tuvalu for a strong legally binding treaty. The establishment of a contact group to discuss this proposal was blocked by Saudi Arabia, India, China, and some other oil exporting countries.

The meeting started with the co-chair stating that a discussion yesterday, there was consensus that there would be a single legally binding base year for each party, but there would not necessarily  be a common base year. There was also widespread consensus on 1990 as a base year. Reference years of interest also included 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007.

Russia clarified their increased ‘commitment’ made yesterday to increase emission reductions to 20-25% below 1990 levels. They said that they want a substantive, comprehensive agreement as a solution to the long-term cooperative action (LCA) track of the negotiations, so are not yet ready to submit 20-25% to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.

Japan stated that its 25% target with hope for a truly global framework. Australia stated its 25% condition is based on an ambitious global outcome. There are 2 possibilities: a new comprehensive global treaty; or a continuation of Kyoto Protocol, accompanied by a new legally binding agreement. Emphasis on legally binding.

Many developing countries including Gambia. Zambia, Sudan, China, and others, opposed having Annex I countries link their commitments to the LCA negotiations. The discussion went on for a while.

Croatia then made some comments on its target, pointing out that there are numerous countries with no obligations which have per-capita emissions higher than Croatia, and that Croatia in 74th in rank in terms of per-capita emissions (Croatia’s emissions are about 7 tonnes per person).

Sweden, on behalf of the EU, made a slide presentation illustrating what an aggregate 30% Annex I target could look like, compared to BAU and current pledges. The delegate did not name any countries, but it could be seen from the slide that Ukraine, Belarus, and Canada would need to do significantly more. The next slide stated that a 30% reduction would be 8 Gt CO2-e compared excluding LULUCF. The next slide showed that in the first commitment period the Kyoto Protocol has about 10 Gt of excess allowances. The following slide showed that a perverse LULUCF outcome would have a similar effect. This would especially be the case with Gross-Net accounting. There were some questions from different countries; the EU clarified that the indicative reductions from different countries are based on wealth, early action, historical responsibility, and population.

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